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This paper deals with Member State compliance with the rules stemming 
from the European Union. It outlines possible routes towards optimalisation, 
and explores how current structures and practises may be transformed and 
adapted so as to arrive at a situation where a maximal effectiveness of 
European norms is ensured. It first clarifies key notions such as compliance, 
non-compliance and effectiveness, highlights the various actors involved, and 
reflects on the current knowns and unknowns in this field of research. 
Subsequently, in discussing various optimalisation strategies, it shuns the 
outmoded ‘unitary actor’-approach, but differentiates between the various 
layers of public authority within Member States: legislative offices, executive 
and administrative bodies, the judiciary. Special attention is devoted to two 
specific topics: 1) a novel Dutch legal framework that strengthens the control 
of the centralised government over subnational actors, and 2) private 
enforcement as a means to stimulate greater observance of EU norms. 
Lastly, in the final paragraph, a number of limitations and negative 
ramifications of the dominant vision on the duties of Member States are 
pointed out, and a case is made for a small but subtle paradigmatic shift. The 
ultimate contention of this paper is that, if EU rules are one day truly to be 
considered as ‘the law of the land’ in each and every Member State, there 
should remain sufficient room for ‘diversity in unity’ as to how these rules are 
being applied, and equally, for a broad representation of the interests of the 
many, instead of just the subjective interests of the few.
KEYWORDS
Compliance; European Union law; Implementation; European integration; 
Europeanisation; Optimalisation
INTRODUCTION
For many lawyers, politicians and policy officials in the European Union, it 
has always remained a glorious pipe dream to achieve and maintain a 
maximal effectiveness of all the rules adopted. In accordance with United 
States’ constitutional terminology, this would denote a situation in which the 
laws and principles originating from the EU are no longer considered foreign 
and external to the national legal systems, but are regarded everywhere as 
part of ‘the law of the land’. Such a situation, in which Member State 
compliance is both optimal and natural, has remained a desideratum up to 
the present day, however utopian it may have seemed from the outset.
In the meanwhile, an abundant literature on compliance has been steadily 
amassing. Especially in the past decade, scholars have been hyperactive in 
researching, proving and disproving the relevance of numerous parameters
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believed or alleged to influence Member State practises, implementation 
strategies, and the success ratio of various types of EU rules (for overviews, 
see Mastenbroek 2005; Sverdrup 2007; Treib 2008). Yet, studies on the 
general prerequisites and facilitating factors for successful compliance in 
abstracto have so far not been conducted. Moreover, the research up until 
now has had but two main focal points, namely 1) the transposition, 
implementation and execution of EU rules (treaty provisions, directives etc.), 
and 2) the practise of national and European administrative bodies, such as 
the Commission and governmental departments, decentralised offices and 
(quasi-)autonomous entities. By consequence, the literature at present is 
replete with black holes on at least two counts: first, as regards studies on 
the actual enforcement of EU rules, the application thereof ‘on the ground’, in 
everyday reality -  despite recent calls to broaden our view and incorporate 
this dimension in future research (e.g. Treib 2008: 18-19; but see Versluis 
2007). Second, too little is known about the conduct of the judiciary, i.e. the 
state of compliance with EU rules by judicial bodies, the third and supposedly 
‘least dangerous branch’ of government (Bickel 1962). The latter gap may be 
due to the fact that legal scholars, after a relatively strong presence at the 
birth of this field of research (e.g. Krislov et. al. 1986; Snyder 1993; Weiler 
1994) appear to have withdrawn in the mid-1990s, and chiefly left the debate 
to political scientist and students of public administration.
The present article, written from a lawyer’s perspective, is a first attempt at 
overcoming the current dearth: by taking a comprehensive view on what 
constitutes a member state, encompassing all three governmental powers 
(legislative, executive, judicial), and also, by considering compliance as both 
process and output, from the adoption of the rules concerned, up to and 
including their factual application and enforcement. Nonetheless, the author 
considers as the main void to be filled an outlining of the route towards 
optimalisation, leaving empirical issues aside for now, and bypassing the 
(unresolved as ever) debate on what the decisive factor(s) might be that 
trigger, tempt or induce Member State authorities to comply. This approach 
is, to a great extent, predicated upon the author’s conviction that it may well 
be impossible to locate the ‘holy grail’ and conclude that particular debate 
once and for all, at least on short notice. Said ‘grail’ might not even exist at 
all: for all we know now, compliance may well come down to an inchoate 
multitude of factors, factors which are so random and so reliant on time, 
space and context that it is impossible to make sound inferences valid for all 
other situations. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the 
accession of new EU members in 2004 and 2007, rather than bringing us 
closer to uncovering the true and universal parameters at play, has shed less 
light than was originally hoped for, as evident from the clashing assertions in 
the recently published research concentrated on the performance of the EU- 
10 and EU-2 (contrast e.g. Sedelmeier 2006 and Toshkov 2008 on the one 
hand with Falkner & Treib 2008 on the other).
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In what follows, we shall first clarify a number of terminological and 
methodological issues, inter alia the notion of effectiveness, the constitutive 
elements of compliance, the EU rules and instruments concerned, and the 
various actors at play. Next, we shall discuss the main sticking points 
encountered in earlier scholarship on compliance, and canvass the present 
knowns and unknowns in the field. Hereafter, we will look at the avenues and 
opportunities for optimalisation, addressing the main layers of authority and 
various branches of government in the Member States in successive order. 
The outmoded unitary actor approach, though still adhered to by some 
theorists of European integration, is thus deliberately left aside. For our 
purposes, it is decidedly unhelpful at any rate to regard Member States as 
monolithic structures, and cling to the highly fictitious idea that they possess 
a single drive and mindset.
During our exploration of the possibilities for optimalisation, several 
improvements and modifications will be suggested. Hereby, two specific 
topics will receive separate attention, namely a new Dutch legal framework 
aimed at ensuring compliance with European law by decentralised public 
bodies, and also, the highly topical issue of private enforcement of EU law. In 
the final paragraph of this paper, some limitations and negative aspects of 
the pursuit of optimal compliance will be sketched. Particularly, the dominant 
approach in the EU as regards ensuring full effectiveness will be critiqued, 
arguing that this approach may have many more detrimental and 
counterproductive effects than is commonly acknowledged.
BOOTING UP: SOME TERMINOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
ISSUES 
Effectiveness
What is meant by the term ‘effectiveness’ with regard to legal rules? The 
celebrated scholar Francis Snyder has taken it to mean the fact that ‘law 
matters’, that ‘it has effects on political, economic and social life outside the 
law, apart from simply the elaboration of legal doctrine’ (Snyder 1990:3). In 
the ‘real world’ under consideration here, that of the European Union, we 
may distinguish between several types of effectiveness, such as the 
enactment of EU policy into legislation by the European institutions, the 
execution of EU regulations by the Member States, the transposition of EU 
directives into domestic law; recourse to litigation in national courts on the 
basis of EU rules, or the use of EU law by economic undertakings, other 
organisations and individuals, in the sense, following Max Weber, that they 
orient their behaviour in relation to European law (cf. Rheinstein 1966:3-5).
As such, effectiveness is an issue of public policy, but it is an issue which is 
certainly not unique to the EU and common to most contemporary states. A
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main cause of ineffectiveness is generally found to be the tension (perennial, 
but only properly acknowledged in the modern age) between centralised 
steering and decentralised action (see e.g. Teubner 1983; Handler 1986). In 
the EU, this tension was thought to be mitigated by the principle of 
‘institutional autonomy’, entailing that European law is principally applied and 
enforced through national regulatory frameworks, with only a residual role for 
supranational supervision, monitoring and control mechanisms. Thus, in the 
system of shared administration that characterises the integrated European 
legal order, the primary responsibility for law observance lies with the 
Member States themselves (Jans et al. 2007:200; see also Rideau 1985:864; 
Treib 2008:5). In this respect, the European multi-level system resembles the 
German system of co-operative federalism, in which federal legislation is 
carried out by the administrations of the Länder, much more than the US 
model of dual federalism, where each level has its own bureaucracy to put 
the respective laws into practise (Scharpf 1988). This absence of a strictly 
hierarchical, command-and-control type of relationship is thought to be 
beneficial to the EU rules’ effects on political, economic and social life, as in 
the application of these rules, a considerable amount of flexibility is retained. 
Simultaneously, this does place a greater strain on a member state’s scarce 
resources, which are distributed unequally across the EU, and often even 
unequally distributed within a single country (Shapiro 2004:255-7).
Compliance
The concept of ‘compliance’ is closely related to the notion of effectiveness, 
and denotes a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour 
and a specified rule (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002: 539). Thus, the 
compliance perspective also starts from a given norm and asks whether the 
addressees thereof actually conform to it (Treib 2008:4). Compliance aims at 
achieving effectiveness. Effectiveness may however also exist without 
compliance proper, for example, if a practice already happens to be in 
conformity with what a norm requires.
The general rule on compliance in EU law is that a Member State is 
accountable for any deficiency or negligence, at whatever level of 
government it may lay. Thus, it may not plead its internal, decentralised or 
functional devolution of power so as to escape the obligations incumbent 
upon it with regard to the application and enforcement of European norms 
and instruments (EU Treaty: Article 4; ECJ, Konle v Österreich, 1999, and 
Commission v Italy, 2002, amongst others). Under limited circumstances 
however, non-compliance may be tolerated: in those rare situations in which 
there exists an ‘absolute impossibility’ to meet the goals of the European rule 
concerned, in particular due to technical reasons (ECJ: Blackpool, 1993), 
when the European rules themselves allow for derogations (e.g. Directive 
91/689, article 7: "In cases of emergency or grave danger, Member States
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shall take all necessary steps, including, where appropriate, temporary 
derogations from this Directive, to ensure that hazardous waste is so dealt 
with as not to constitute a threat to the population or the environment”), or 
when non-compliance can be justified on exceptional grounds corresponding 
to a general interest that is superior to the general interest represented by the 
European rule (ECJ: Leybucht, 1989).
Non-compliance
Compliance constitutes a major challenge to Member States. The fact that 
they are bound to transpose directives entails that they may not fail to enact 
the transposing legislation, neither transpose a directive inadequately, 
partially or untimely. On the other hand, uniform application requires some 
real dedication from national administrations, courts and potential litigators, 
and can be hampered or facilitated by parameters inherent to the particular 
political system or culture. Thus, non-compliance can occur all too easily, 
and takes various forms. Krislov et al. identified numerous different 
manifestations, including lack of implementation, lack of application, lack of 
enforcement, pre- and post-litigation non-compliance, defiance and evasion 
(Krislov et al. 1986:61 ff.). Their taxonomy is however rather murky, and their 
distinction between the various types is far from clear-cut. It would seem 
more useful to focus on the various stages following the adoption of a (new) 
European rule, wherewith the myriad of possibilities for failure and deficiency 
may emerge to the fullest extent.
What may be dubbed the ‘implementation trajectory’ can be broken down into 
four phases (Jans et al. 1999:32 ff.): transposition (obligatory in case of EU 
directives, illegal as regards EU regulations and decisions); 
operationalisation (the designation of competent authorities and entrusting 
these with the execution, application and enforcement); application (putting 
the new rules in practise, outlining and/or updating possible internal policy 
guidelines); and finally, enforcement (monitoring transgressions and 
sanctioning transgressors). In each of these stages, the conduct of the 
responsible authority can be tardy, incomplete, or partially or wholly incorrect. 
Non-compliance by national courts can take the specific forms of delay, 
evasion or (partial) non-application of rules and precedents. Volcansek has 
brought further refinement to the latter analysis by distinguishing accidental 
malpractice from more deliberate defiance (Volcansek 1986:8-9).
Actors
As indicated already above, an equally wide-ranging list could be drawn up of 
all actors involved in the successfully completion of the implementation 
trajectory in a given Member State. Nonetheless, the most relevant players at 
differing levels of public authority have come to be well established.
6
Scurrying through the classic branches of government, it concerns the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Typically though, legislative, 
executive and administrative offices and bodies may be found at more than 
one layer (especially in federal states) and subdivided further into central and 
decentralised ones. Effectiveness of EU law is then only guaranteed if all of 
these function within normal parameters, and operate in tandem where 
necessary. Further below, we shall address these in close succession, 
exploring existing obstacles and bottlenecks and outlining possible routes 
towards optimalisation.
Rules
Finally, there are the types of rules adopted on the European plane that 
Member States have to comply with. As touched upon already, EU 
regulations and decisions ‘merely’ require execution, application or 
enforcement, and the same holds true for certain provisions in the European 
treaties themselves. Directives also demand transposing legislation. All of 
these rules may be ‘directly effective’, meaning that they can be invoked 
before national courts of law, albeit not ‘horizontally’, i.e. between individuals, 
where directives are concerned (ECJ: Marshall, 1986; Faccini Dori, 1994). 
Yet, only few rules in the treaties enjoy such effect, though there are many 
certified cases of the (more common) ‘vertical’ direct effect, i.e. that the 
provisions may always be relied upon in court against public authorities.
There exists, moreover, the nebulous category of ‘soft-law’, policy 
instruments lacking officially binding status, which are employed ever more 
frequently in the past decade and appear to be incrementally gaining in legal 
stature (Senden 2004; Senden 2005). Nonetheless, one encounters such 
great diversity here that no inferences can be made on their general 
implications and as regards the obligations they impose. The treaties also 
remain completely silent on the issue.
Lastly, there are the orders and judgments of the EU courts (the European 
Court of Justice, the General Court, the Civil Service Tribunal) that should be 
adhered to. Although a system of precedent did not exist originally and 
officially still does not exist today, ECJ case-law has successfully set an 
evolution into this direction in motion, and EU courts’ pronouncements are 
nowadays regarded as binding precedents by most national judges (Craig 
and De Burca 2008:467-474).
COMPLIANCE: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS
Compliance is officially monitored by the European Commission, which, since 
1997, annually draws up Internal Market Scoreboards (e.g. European 
Commission 2009). It may also investigate and pursue possible situations of 
non-compliance through the so-called infraction procedure, contained in
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Articles 258-260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (formerly 
Articles 226-228 of the EC Treaty). It may do so either of its own motion, on 
the basis of a complaint from individuals, or following information submitted 
by Member States or Members of the European Parliament. Owing to these 
monitoring and verification mechanisms, much statistical information on 
infringements of EU law by Member State has become available, but 
unfortunately, these overall give only a limited view of the actual state of 
affairs. Infringements unnoticed by and/or not brought to the attention of the 
Commission do not appear in the official figures. Furthermore, the 
Commission enjoys discretion as regards the formal instigation of 
proceedings, and it may refrain from doing so at any given time. By 
consequence, as regards the factual state of compliance, the ‘unknowns’ still 
appear to greatly outnumber the ‘knowns’, and the evidence in figures is 
sketchy at best.
Many theorists on compliance have nonetheless sought recourse to the 
statistics on infraction procedures and drawn far-reaching conclusions on the 
basis of official data on non-transposition and subsequent court cases (e.g. 
Mendrinou 1996; Ciavarini Azzi 2000; Börzel 2001; Tallberg 2002; Beach 
2005). More realism is displayed by Falkner et al. (2005:18), who assert that 
‘Commission statistics (...) only represent the bit of non-compliance the 
Commission can see and wants to publicise’. Mastenbroek too has rightly 
criticised the research as revealing only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ (Mastenbroek 
2005:1115), and Treib has estimated that scholars concentrating solely on 
transposition rates and notification data may be turning a blind eye to some 
40 percent of all actual cases of non-compliance (Treib 2008:16). In all, 
nobody knows the true size of the compliance deficit, and more systematic 
research on the actual level of non-compliance is to be welcomed (Falkner et 
al. 2005:18).
Unfortunately, there has yet to emerge a methodological consensus on how 
compliance can best be measured. Some prefer a qualitative approach, 
focusing on a small number of directives in a single policy field and studying 
compliance in a select number of Member States. Others engage in 
quantitative studies, comparing compliance across countries and policy 
sectors. The involvement of both too many and too few EU legal instruments 
hampers the possibility to draw general conclusions -  yet, what number of 
instruments would be ‘about right’ to focus on is unclear. In all likelihood, 
cross-sectoral studies are much more helpful than single-sector ones, but 
each sector is characterised by its own idiosyncrasies, and it remains tricky 
to pick out those sectors that are truly suitable to be compared. By 
consequence, theories on compliance developed so far have turned out to be 
‘sometimes true theories’ at most (Falkner et al. 2007), valid for some 
countries, but certainly not for all. The empirical results do however 
convincingly show that there are huge inter-country disparities, but that
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strong similarities exist nonetheless among (members of) different groups of 
countries. Falkner and Treib (2008) have distinguished four ‘world of 
compliance’: the world of law observance (predominated by a culture of 
respect for the rule of law), the world of neglect (where such a culture is 
absent), the world of domestic politics (where political preferences of 
government parties and other powerful players determine compliance) and 
the world of dead letters (where obligations are met on paper, but not put into 
actual practice).
The certainties are thus few and far between. The size of the compliance 
deficit and the correct methodology with which it could be assessed currently 
belong to the category of the unknowns. The knowns are that there exists a 
compliance deficit, and that several patterns of compliance persist among the 
Member States. Since every legal system is familiar with the gap between 
the law in the books and the law in action in every legal system, there is no 
greater cause for concern here than elsewhere: long delays and attempts at 
shirking the rules are a matter of everyday business (Treib 2008:5). As 
Snyder asserted, it would be rather more remarkable if, in this respect, the 
EU would be any different from other legal systems (Snyder 1993:26). This is 
not to say however that no efforts should be made to minimise the 
discrepancy, and to tackle those problems and obstacles that are capable of 
being overcome. This is the focal point of the next section of this paper, 
where, drawing from previous research, and in an attempt to fill a vexing 
lacuna in compliance literature, improvements of current structures and 
practises and specific strategies towards optimalisation will be outlined. As 
announced, in line with earlier suggestions not to overemphasise formal 
transposition data and statistics and neglect the side of actual application and 
enforcement, we shall take all stages of the implementation trajectory into 
account (although through the prism of optimalisation and not to investigate 
empirical claims). Also, as said, one cannot fail to acknowledge that the 
different stages involve different actors; by studying these at multiple levels, 
we will move beyond simplistic causal models, highlighting and unravelling 
the complex web of administrative, institutional and actor-based factors that 
determine the success of certain EU rules and the lack of success of others’ 
(Falkner et al. 2002; 2004). Finally, also in contrast with earlier research, we 
shall also incorporate the perspectives of the judiciary, and address the issue 
of compliance by national courts. It was already recommended more than a 
decade ago to point out those inadequacies that can at least be partially 
resolved or closed (Snyder 1993:26). Thereby, one simultaneously sheds 
light on why these defects exist. For public officials, building on this analysis, 
it should prove possible to stimulate a further aligning of the various worlds of 
compliance, in spite of the cultural variables that are specific to a country or 
group of countries and may justifiably be considered immutable. In so doing, 
more counterweight would be given to those states profiting from suboptimal
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Despite the clear obligations imposed by EU law on any national office not to 
act contrary to European rules and objectives (EU Treaty: Article 4; ECJ: 
Simmenthal, 1977), from an internal perspective, official law-makers still 
enjoy a free rein to engage in such transgressions, as long as no clear 
national rules and principles stand in their way. For this reason, the insertion 
of so-called ‘Europe-clauses’ in national constitutions is a practise to be 
encouraged; for entrenching references to European law in the charter that 
ranks as the highest piece of legislation in a country, ensures that the 
possible (in)validity of (proposed) legislation is not just considered in light of 
domestic practises and provisions. Experiences in Belgium and Italy have 
demonstrated that whenever the membership of the EU and the incumbent 
responsibilities are ‘constitutionalised’, the chances decrease for the future 
that contravening rules of national laws are adopted (Vandamme 2008; Rossi 
2009). Exceptions to this rule do exist, most notably in the Netherlands, a 
country characterised by an extreme openness to European law, despite the 
absence of any explicit reference thereto in the Dutch ‘grondwet’ (basic law) 
(see e.g. Claes and De Witte 1998). Nonetheless, a solid anchoring of EU 
tasks and exigencies in national (constitutional) law surely facilitates their 
being lived up to. The big boon thereof would be that legislative offices are no 
longer able to ignore them at their discretion; henceforth, such would entail a 
violation of domestic law (obligations that have been enshrined in the highest 
law of the land) as well. This also increases a sense of ‘co-ownership’ of 
particular norm conflicts, which may spur the drive towards their resolution.
A second important element concerns knowledge distribution and adequate 
information management. Of course, the individual members of governments 
and parliaments must remain highly vigilant themselves, but they should be 
kept abreast of novel EU rules and policies by others as well. The 
responsibilities and duties of EU bodies in this regard have been enshrined in 
the European treaties long ago, and the system is further enhanced by the 
new ‘early warning system’ that the Lisbon Treaty provides for (see Protocol 
Nr. 1 ‘On the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, and 
Protocol Nr. 2 ‘On the Application of the Principles of the Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality’, annexed to the newly consolidated EU Treaties). Preferably 
then, the awareness among staff officials in national legislative branches of 
possible European dimensions to the issues to be addressed is at maximum 
level. This entails first of all that their permanent education and training
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include modules on EU law and policy. Special attention for (obtaining) such 
awareness could also be incorporated in the standard recruitment and 
human resource policy. Next, the forming and expansion of networks of law­
making experts (already existent in some fields, e.g. IMPEL for the 
environment) is highly desirable, offering a broad forum and direct contacts 
for exchanging best practises (cf. De Visser 2009). Such initiatives already 
received the thumbs-up long ago, and the subsequent processes have been 
described as bureaucratic interpenetration, structural coupling or inter- 
organisatorial exchange (Levine and White 1961). Finally, all relevant data 
resources should be generally accessible and fully kept up-to-date. All 
pointers, guidelines and benchmarks for (future) national legislation supplied 
by the various EU institutions, agencies and bodies should thus be 
immediately disseminated and followed-up upon, which requires permanent 
vigilance at the departments concerned with drafting, attending and revising 
legislation. Because of the widespread availability, affordability and 
sophistication of modern information and communication technologies, there 
is no excuse anymore for public sector organisations not establishing the 
necessary internal linkages or ensuring the proper knowledge infrastructure. 
Some Member States have rushed ahead in impressive fashion, enabling 
jurists to tap into splendid data resources, provided for by dedicated agencies 
set up to transmit specific EU law expertise (e.g. ‘Europa Decentraal’ in the 
Netherlands, a knowledge and training centre that aims to supply 
decentralised authorities with know-how).
Executive and Administrative Bodies
Much of what has been said just now in relation to legislative offices can be 
repeated when it comes to national executive and administrative bodies. 
Particularly, the quality of the training of civil servants and the range of 
resources at their disposal is of crucial significance for (improving) the 
compliance ratio. Likewise, structural transnational cooperation between 
administrative and executive bodies, both on the horizontal (= between 
Member States) and the vertical plane (= between Member States and EU 
authorities), could guarantee that more and more potential infringements of 
EU law are staved off (Jans et al. 2007:222). In eurospeak, it is common to 
refer to the term of parténariat, partnership, in this context (Snyder 1993:36). 
Again, many of such linkages are already up and running (e.g. EUROPOL 
and EUROJUST as networks for police and judicial cooperation, as well as 
various other EU agencies dealing with e.g. food safety, trademarks and 
designs, transport, chemicals and fundamental rights). Dialogues with 
Member States are undertaken in the preparation of transposing legislation, 
and ‘sectoral’ or ‘package meetings’ also occur regularly, scheduled 
encounters between Commission and national officials to review progress in
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the application of directives and other secondary law instruments. Reciprocal 
staff exchanges also take place.
In the executive and administrative domain, quite a lot then has already been 
achieved. We have witnessed the creation of special bodies dealing with EU 
issues, and of special sections within existing departments. Thus, for 
example in the United Kingdom, trusted quantities such as the Ministry for 
Agriculture and Fisheries, the Department of Customs and Excise and of 
Trade and Industry underwent spectacular transformations already in the 
mid-1970s (Bender 1991:13). Other illustrious precedents, extremely 
instructive for the newly acceded EU Member States, are the secretariat 
general du comité interministeriél pour les questions de co-opération 
économique européenne in France (see Meny 1988:285-294; in 2005, it was 
finally transformed into the secrétariat général des affaires européennes) and 
the dipartimento per il coordinamento delle politiche comunitarie in Italy (see 
Chiti 1989:90). Much however remains to be done, even in the ‘old’ EU-15. 
Especially for federal or decentralised Member States, the prior suggestions 
could yet prove inadequate, and not even a rock-solid entrenchment of EU 
commitments in the basic law may suffice there to optimise the daily dealings 
of a plethora of executive and administrative bodies at the various levels of 
government. Arguably, following an old Dutch maxim that ‘it is good to trust a 
person, but better to keep him under close control’, the installation of a more 
rigid legal framework would produce better results still. This is at least the 
choice that has been made recently in the Netherlands’ decentralised system 
of governance, with the launch of the ‘wet NErpe’.
• Leading by Example: The Dutch NErpe
Translated into English, the Dutch abbreviation ‘NErpe’ stands for 
‘compliance with European rules by public entities’ (Naleving Europese 
regels door publieke entiteiten). The proposed law, expected to enter into 
force in early 2010, has to be read to the background of the rather dire Dutch 
compliance record, as well as the imminent challenges presented by the 
(in)famous Services Directive of the EU (see e.g. Barnard 2008; De Waele 
2009). The objective of the NErpe is to strengthen the hold of the central 
authorities in The Hague over all other public sector actors that are involved, 
at any stage, in the implementation trajectory of European rules. In case of 
deficiencies, whether deliberate or inadvertent, it provides for a capacious 
tool-box that enables a swift (though fairly authoritarian) form of resolution. 
The general practise will be that a cabinet minister, sometimes after conferral 
with one of this equals at a different department, issues a binding instruction 
to the public entity concerned when it does not live up to its EU law 
obligations, or when it does so untimely. The entity concerned may explain 
itself and give its views on the matter, but if it fails to convince and the
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instruction is still not complied with within the time-limit specified, the required 
remedy shall be put in place immediately on the order of the central 
government (Articles 2 and 5).
The NErpe was designed with a special view to the sectors of state aid and 
public procurement, where substantial financial interests are involved, and 
the Dutch record is rather unimpressive, to say the least (Telgen 2004). 
Member States will, as explained above, be continually held accountable for 
any mishaps nonetheless, even if attributable to quasi-autonomous 
governmental bodies. The NErpe will however fulfil a particularly important 
role in guaranteeing the proper observance of the Services Directive. This 
EU instrument, which was to be fully implemented by the end of 2009, 
requires that the entire public sector of a Member State verify whether 
existing, new or modified national rules are in accordance with the provisions 
of the Directive, and send notifications thereof to the European Commission. 
The bureaucratic impact of this Herculean exercise has opened up the floor 
for manifold violations of European rules, even if purely accidental, on an 
unprecedented scale (cf. De Waele 2009). The NErpe law may thus be 
interpreted as the latest of ‘damage-control’ mechanisms.
The severe impact of direct intervention, subordinating the entity concerned 
to a higher command, irrespective of competences specifically attributed to it, 
entails though that it be employed with extreme caution. The law also rules 
out interference with court practise and correction errors of judges, which 
appears more than sensible in light of the age-old principle of the separation 
of powers.
As remarked before, all EU Member States should have the instruments at 
their disposal that guarantee a situation optimal compliance. The Netherlands 
already possesses a generic legal framework for supervision and control in 
inter alia the municipal and provincial law (the ‘Gemeentewet’ and the 
‘Provinciewet’), but the NErpe offers an ultimate and extremely powerful 
means. It could, and perhaps should, be emulated by other Member States. 
Belgium and Germany already have similar systems in place. In France 
however, the competences of decentralised authorities have expanded 
greatly since the 1980s, yet they are merely obliged to inform the central 
government of important decisions, and there exist only specialised and fairly 
weak control mechanisms in case of omissions or gross negligence. The 
same goes mutatis mutandis for Spain, and for the United Kingdom in the 
post-devolution era. For these and other countries, it is contended that it 
would be worthwhile to take a pit-stop on the road towards optimalisation, 
and take a closer look at the merits of the Dutch NErpe.
The Judiciary
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As clear as day, to get any closer to a situation of full compliance, the 
importance of efficient and well co-ordinated administrations can hardly be 
underestimated (Treib 2008:11). What goes for policy officials and civil 
servants in the other branches of government, equally holds true then for 
courts: the awareness among magistrates and legal practitioners of the EU 
dimension of their work should be maximized (Biondi 2009:225; Prechal 
2006:431). The European Parliament has recently called for ‘a systematic 
incorporation of an EU component into the training for, and examinations to 
enter the judicial professions’; for a ‘further strengthening of that component 
from the earliest possible stage onwards, with an increased focus on 
practical aspects’, and for that component to ‘cover methods of interpretation 
and legal principles which may be unknown to the domestic legal order, but 
which play an important role in Community law’ (European Parliament 2008; 
see also Working Group 2008:7). Similarly, Prechal has argued for a revision 
of the place of that subject area in existing law degree programmes (Prechal 
2006:433-434). Swifter and easier to achieve would seem to be a greater 
dissemination of European law knowledge to those in the field. Of course, 
they may equally profit from the resources and linkages already referred to 
above (e.g. services that EUROPOL may render, dedicated agencies like 
‘Europa Decentraal’ in the Netherlands, organisations such as the 
Association of Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of 
the European Union and the Network of Presidents of Supreme Courts). 
Attention should also be drawn to the Dutch ‘Eurinfra’-project, which has 
resulted in the appointment of resident experts on EU law in all national 
courts, and an expansion and permanent sedimentation of the necessary 
resources (Winter 2006; see also Prechal et al. 2005). However, the EU 
Courts themselves could contribute here as well by drafting US-style 
‘restatements’ of their case-law (complimentary publications that outline the 
‘state of the art’ on a particular topic), preferably handing new versions out on 
a regular basis.
For the uniform interpretation and effective application of EU law, the pursuit 
of a continual inter-judicial dialogue between national magistrates would most 
likely have a favourable impact (cf. Benvenisti & Downs 2009:65-71). 
Domestic courts are however also expected to cooperate with their EU 
counterparts, especially through the so-called preliminary references 
mechanism (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU: Article 267). In the early 
1980s however, the EU courts have taken a huge leap of faith, by allowing 
national courts to resolve disputes on their own without asking for guidance 
in Luxembourg, as long as the issue is ‘manifestly clear’ or if the EU courts 
themselves have already ruled on the issue in a similar case (ECJ: CILFIT, 
1981).
It is contended here that national courts would be increasingly good at 
enforcing Member State compliance if even greater trust was placed in them,
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which would imply further relaxation of the so-called ‘CILFIT-criteria’, and 
greater reticence from the side of the Commission as regards initiating 
infringement proceedings for deviant court behaviour (cf. ECJ, Commission v 
Italy, 2004; Commission v Spain, 2009). For arguably, the latter only breeds 
opposition, and upsets the balance of power in Member States: since the 
main branches of government cannot freely correct the judiciary, due to the 
sacrosanct principle of judicial independence, holding these branches liable 
for judicial acts nonetheless delivers a ‘shock to the system’ which may result 
in increased resistance, hostility and non-compliance. The former suggestion, 
a relaxation of the so-called CILFIT criteria, is nowadays advocated by 
multiple authors (e.g. Broberg 2008:1390; see also Working Group 2008). 
This would mean that national courts would be entitled to make even fewer 
references and only when strictly necessary, thus reducing delay in national 
court procedures (ordinarily, the preliminary reference procedure takes more 
than a year before the national court will receive an answer from 
Luxembourg: see ECJ, Annual Report 2008). In addition, if they then would 
be able to propose answers themselves to the ECJ when making a 
reference, the whole process could be considerably sped-up as well 
(Working Group 2008:7). Of course, this would equally pose the risk of 
greater non-compliance, rather than the converse situation. Lessons may 
well be drawn here from Sweden, where stronger motivation requirements 
were introduced for judges attempting to resolve EU law disputes without 
making a reference to the European courts (cf. Broberg 2008:1395).
In similar vein, it is perhaps already time to ditch the Köbler-doctrine -  though 
still in its infancy -  through which litigants can hold EU Member States liable 
for any judicial errors related to questions of EU law (ECJ: Köbler, 2004). 
This newly created remedy could be welcomed for strengthening court 
compliance, but may equally cause further court-clogging at both national 
and European courts (Wattel 2004:186). If nevertheless retained, there is 
good reason to demand that the ECJ itself render judgments that are clear, 
understandable, convincing and solidly argued. The Köbler judgment fails to 
live up to that standard (Wattel 2004:178-182), and the general trend, sadly, 
appears to be one of decline (Bobek 2008:1639-1640).
• Private Enforcement: A Questionable Route?
Over the past years, the European Commission has presented itself as a 
zealous proponent of private enforcement of EU legal norms, especially as 
regards the rules of competition law (European Commission 2005; 2008). 
National competition authorities can impose penalty payments and 
(administrative) fines on undertakings violating the competition rules, yet 
actions for damages brought by private parties before national civil courts are 
alleged to be just as effective. It is estimated that increased litigation in 
national courts by individual consumers and undertakings even ensures a
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better observance of the rules concerned, diminishing the enforcement 
burden for public authorities. This tactic has been gradually facilitated by the 
EU Courts, starting in the early 1990s, by enabling private actors to sue 
negligent Member States for financial compensation (ECJ: Francovich, 
Brasserie du Pêcheur), progressively moving on in the next ten years, 
galvanising inter-party litigation (ECJ: Courage v Crehan, 2001; Muñoz, 
2002; Manfredi, 2006). Here too, of course, success will depend heavily on 
the aptitude, training and vigilance of national judges.
A slight hesitancy is however cropping up here, and not wholly unjustifiably. 
For indeed, if all those negatively affected by non-compliance of others would 
more quickly take matters into their own hands, compliance would increase, 
and public enforcement could indeed become largely redundant. This would 
however reinforce a ‘litigation culture’ in the EU similar to that in the US, 
setting an unfamiliar, sparking a more distrustful sentiment in European 
society. In addition, it should not be forgotten that it is lawyers who benefit 
mostly from an increase in court cases, whereas after lengthy and costly 
litigation, client satisfaction is far from assured (cf. Wigger and Nolke 2007). 
Also, a greater stimulus of private enforcement would result in higher 
administrative and logistical burdens for the judiciary, which can probably not 
be easily shouldered in all Member States without extra expenditure. Finally, 
across the board, a further harmonisation of national procedural law is likely 
to prove an exigency, leading to a further erosion of Member State autonomy 
in this particular field (cf. Jans et al. 2007:369-370).
These pitfalls are both real and substantial. Private parties could then in 
many other ways be induced to live up to EU principles more fully. Targeted 
communication strategies and specific financial incentives (from the 
European or national level) may, for instance, stimulate voluntary and more 
spontaneous observance of the rules in force. After an elaborate and 
concentrated (inherently moral, though not necessarily moralistic) appeal, 
transgressors may become more fully aware of the added value for their own 
conduct of business of full rule observance by others. The Kantian moral 
imperative could then kick in, bringing us closer to the utopian world of 
optimal compliance at a much more rapid pace. Thus, though private 
enforcement holds great promise, there appear to be more serene ways 
towards attaining the goals pursued.
BUT HAS THE EU GOT IT RIGHT?
The latter points already shed doubts on some of the overall EU objectives. 
Even when those concerned would fully commit themselves to all the 
strategies outlined above, leading eventually to a world of more perfect
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Member State compliance, three major limitations and potentially harmful 
ramifications of said strategies must ultimately not be overlooked.
Firstly, even if Member States are to go ‘all the way’, a great responsibility 
continues to lie with EU bodies and agencies as well, and for several years 
already, the quality of EU governance and legislation has been a subject of 
hefty debate. When then the rule-making output of the European branches of 
government is of itself substandard, and when their record is not without fault 
as regards communicating efficiently and offering full and proper guidance to 
their national counterparts, the latter surely cannot be held accountable 
automatically for the occurrence of any non-compliant practises. As 
indicated, the Commission already stages so-called ‘package meetings’ with 
domestic civil servants, where the latter are given room to evaluate on EU 
rules and comment on their practical applicability, but this amounts at most to 
curing the symptoms, not the underlying ailments. It is thus essential to come 
up with clear, well-churned, meticulously drafted EU legislation that links in 
smoothly with national rules and policies. Despite the recent disproving of the 
so-called ‘goodness of fit’-hypothesis, which claimed that the successful 
implementation of European rules is largely determined by pre-existent 
national laws and attitudes towards EU integration (see Knill and Lenschow 
1998; Haverland 2000; Falkner et al. 2005), this does not entail that the 
quality and acceptability of those rules is completely irrelevant, and it remains 
advisable to seize each and every opportunity for enhancement in this 
regard. A similar responsibility falls to dedicated EU agencies and bodies: the 
more their daily running of business is in shipshape order, the more Member 
State officials could profit from it. Moreover, a lack of monitoring and 
surveillance increases the possibilities for abuse, rendering it ever more 
crucial that an entity like OLAF (Office de la lutte anti-fraude, the Brussels- 
based anti-fraud watchdog of the EU) performs in accordance with ordinary 
working parameters (cf. Spiteri 2004). In some areas, EU intervention goes 
somewhat further, requiring the Member States themselves to set up 
specialised enforcement agencies. This has been the case in the most fraud- 
ridden sectors, for example in the olive oil and tobacco industry (see further 
Jans et al. 2005:221-222). These agencies are in fact testimony of a nearly 
perfect middle-way approach: though they operate as such under national 
control, their duties and organisation are largely spelled out by the EU.
A second point to consider here, limiting the purport of what has been 
remarked so far, is that a situation of full Member State compliance is 
perhaps of itself an intrinsically misguided objective. Unsettling as this may 
seem, there is ample evidence to suggest that a demand of faithful and 
integral rule observance easily turns out to be counterproductive, and 
actually strengthens latent inclinations for non-compliant behaviour. The well- 
known Dutch approach of ‘gedogen’ is a case in point. ‘Gedogen’ denotes
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deliberate inaction from the side of public authorities vis-à-vis norm 
violations, rooted in the idea that certain situations and practises can be 
better regulated and contained through a non-repressive approach. The 
typical Netherlands example concerns the national drug policy, which 
differentiates in the applicable sanction and enforcement system between 
hard and soft drugs, as well as between the trade, sale, production and 
consumption phases thereof. Generally, the sale and consumption of limited 
amounts of soft drugs is condoned, freeing up resources to combat mass- 
sale and production. International and comparative health surveys have 
through the years underscored the success of ‘gedogen’: the figures display 
a highly favourable record of the Netherlands concerning addiction and drug 
abuse, the crime rate is comparatively lower, and the legalisation of specific 
forms of trade and consumption has allowed for a concentration of limited 
government means (see EMCDDA 2009).
As seen above, in EU law however, non-compliance may only be tolerated in 
extremely limited circumstances (see also, recently, ECJ, Commission v 
Netherlands, 2009). The strong emphasis on effectiveness of European rules 
at almost any cost appears to leave little room for condoning certain forms of 
non-compliance. In addition, a gradual shift can be observed in recent years, 
where the EU institutions have started to move beyond the promotion of 
administrative sanctions at rule violations, but are moving closer and closer 
towards obliging a purely punitive approach (ECJ, Commission v Greece, 
1988; Germany v Commission, 1994; Commission v Council, 2005; 
Commission v Council, 2007). Among scholars, this relentless EU intrusion 
into the domain of national criminal law has raised many an eyebrow. 
Punitive sanctions are nowadays considered ‘sexy’ in Brussels offices, but 
the true added value for the sought-after effectiveness of European law is 
rather dubious (see Buruma and Somsen 2001; Faure and Heine 2005). The 
time might be rife for a step back, and for a more open admission of Member 
States’ ability to judge the approach they themselves deem the ‘best fit’. 
Hackneyed as such an appeal may seem , a subtle paradigm atic shift is 
called for here, partly inspired by the principle of subsidiarity, from the 
remorseless command-and-control perspective towards more cooperative 
reining and steering methods.
Lastly, even when the outlined strategies are implemented in full, taking the 
strict perspective wherein full adherence to the rules in force always equals a 
situation of optimal compliance, there remains cause for caution on other 
grounds, when engaging in structural reform. Especially to the countries that 
recently acceded to the Union, the limitations of the official EU vision on 
Member States’ duties and responsibilities have become poignantly clear. 
The soft stimulus, most manifest during the accession process, towards the 
creation of greater vertical linkages between European and national actors,
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as outlined above, are generally to be welcomed. Besides, the emergence of 
a true culture of dialogue would go a long way in quelling the democratic 
deficit and the uncanny sense of distance still experienced by the governed. 
Considerable care should be taken here to allow for a broad representation 
of interests, not limited to those subjective interests expressed by 
governments, or by the most powerful undertakings and organisations 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991:133 ff.) What is more, establishing greater 
horizontal linkages within a single Member State, and also among Member 
States, so as to streamline the information flows relating to EU rules and 
practises, instigating cross-cutting dialogues, and becoming accustomed to 
structural dialogues with Brussels-based officials, can give rise to a disturbing 
condition of myopia: for legislative offices, executive and administrative 
bodies, as well as the judiciary, will more often than not press for their own 
agenda, and seek to adjust to the new reality without sacrificing too much of 
their bureaucratic autonomy. Thus, they will attempt to use, mould and bend 
the rules in their own favour, supposedly for the benefit of EU effectiveness, 
but in truth slightly more to the detriment of their national seniors; after all, 
from the moment one is forced to serve two masters, instead of the previous 
one, it becomes easier and more tempting to deceive both, and finally have 
one’s own cake and eat it too. More than forty years ago, one scholar already 
warned of the danger that technical ministries and services will grow 
rampantly and become the dominant actors, along with their EU 
counterparts, in the direction and management of major parts of society, if 
not the entire economy (Scheinman 1966:769). Once they realise the novel 
potential here, matters will be all too anxious to present particular (political) 
choices of their own as inevitable, or if more convenient, as ideologically 
neutral at most. Simultaneously, once a dossier is presented as containing a 
European dimension, this may serve as a magician’s wand to e.g. unlock 
previously unavailable funds, or set aside legitimate concerns, compelling 
politicians and citizens into directions that were in fact not tyrannically 
superimposed on the supranational plane at all (cf. Putnam 1988). In sum, 
the increasing interpenetration of the EU and national levels of governmental 
authority risks accentuating an already great orientation towards bureaucratic 
means of policy-making, encouraging cultures and techniques of problem­
solving that escape public scrutiny, and to a growing extent, serve the 
interests of anonymous and unaccountable civil servants only. Thus, though 
it is foolish to object to multi-level governance and the stale mantra of 
interlinked policy and communication networks, the interdependence of 
domestic and European actors ought not to function as a va banque type 
motto: tried and tested national approaches are to be kept and refined, not 
pre-emptively abandoned; equally, sub-national actors and civil servants 
should not suddenly be permitted a free reign.
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On the road towards optimalisation of Member State compliance with EU 
laws and policies, it is the ultimate contention of this paper, varying on the 
Union’s own creed, that there should remain sufficient room for ‘diversity in 
unity’ as to how rules are being applied; and that the interests of the many 
should be broadly represented, instead of the subjective and (dangerously 
parochial) ones of the few. Thus, on relatively short notice, Europe may stand 
on a par with the United States -  which, after all, adheres to the idea of ‘E 
Pluribus Unum’ itself. The rules created on the lofty European stratum may 
then in each and every Member State be regarded as something that is 
profoundly native -  as ‘law of the land’.
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